Labour's record on neighbourhood renewal in England: policy, spending and outcomes 1997-2010 by Lupton, Ruth et al.
Labour’s Record on Neighbourhood Renewal in England: 
Policy, Spending and Outcomes 1997-2010 
 
Ruth Lupton, Alex Fenton and Amanda Fitzgerald 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
Policy Goals ............................................................................................................................... 2 
Policies ....................................................................................................................................... 8 
Public Spending on Neighbourhood Renewal in England ....................................................... 12 
Inputs and Outputs ................................................................................................................... 17 
Individual Social and Economic Outcomes ............................................................................. 24 
Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 32 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE/177 Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion 
October 2013  London School of Economics 
 Houghton Street 
 London WC2A 2AE 
 CASE enquiries – tel: 020 7955 6679 
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion 
 
The Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE) is a multi-disciplinary 
research centre based at the London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE), within the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and 
Related Disciplines (STICERD). Our focus is on exploration of different dimensions 
of social disadvantage, particularly from longitudinal and neighbourhood 
perspectives, and examination of the impact of public policy. 
 
In addition to our discussion paper series (CASEpapers), we produce occasional 
summaries of our research in CASEbriefs, and reports from various conferences and 
activities in CASEreports. All these publications are available to download free from 
our website. Limited printed copies are available on request.  
 
For further information on the work of the Centre, please contact the Centre Manager, 
Jane Dickson, on: 
 
Telephone:  UK+20 7955 6679 
Fax:  UK+20 7955 6951 
Email:  j.dickson@lse.ac.uk 
Web site: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case 
 
 
 
 
© Ruth Lupton 
 Alex Fenton 
 Amanda Fitzgerald 
 
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be 
quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including  notice, is 
given to the source. 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Editorial note 
This is one of a series of working papers which form the first stage of a programme of 
research, Social Policy in a Cold Climate, designed to examine the effects of the 
major economic and political changes in the UK since 2007, particularly their impact 
on the distribution of wealth, poverty, income inequality and spatial difference. The 
full programme of analysis will include policies and spending decisions from the last 
period of the Labour government (2007-2010), including the beginning of the 
financial crisis, as well as those made by the Coalition government since May 2010. 
The programme is funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Nuffield 
Foundation, with London-specific analysis funded by the Trust for London. The views 
expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the funders.  
 
The research is taking place from October 2011 to May 2015. More detail and other 
papers in the series will be found at:  
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case/_new/research/Social_Policy_in_a_Cold_Climate.asp  
 
In our first set of papers, including this, we look back at the policies of the Labour 
government from 1997 to 2010, charting their approach and assessing their impact on 
the distribution of outcomes and on poverty and inequality particularly. This provides 
a baseline for analysing and understanding the changes that are now taking place 
under the Coalition government. All these papers approach this by following a chain 
from ultimate policy aims, through specific policy objectives, to public spending and 
other policies, to outcomes. This provides a device for the systematic analysis and 
comparison of activity and impact in different social policy areas. A short 
supplementary paper defining the terms used in the framework and exploring its uses 
and limitations is available at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/spcc/RN001.pdf  
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Abstract 
When he came to power in 1997, Tony Blair reacted to widening disparities between 
poorer and richer neighbourhoods by declaring that no one in future decades should be 
seriously disadvantaged by where they lived.  This paper reviews the policies that 
Labour pursued and assesses how close it came to realising Blair’s vision.  It draws on 
speeches, policy documents, government website and evaluation reports,  and on new 
analysis of administrative and survey data.   We find that Labour’s neighbourhood 
initial policy approach - the cross departmental National Strategy for Neighbourhood 
Renewal, with its ‘floor targets’ below which no neighbourhood should fall – was 
distinctive, although after 2007 there was a move away from this approach towards a 
narrower focus on economic regeneration, at large spatial scales, and  on the reduction 
of worklessness.  Evaluations report that the policies pursued represented value for 
money and there were trends towards positive outcomes.  Physical environments and 
services got better during Labour’s term in office – a direct result of the policies 
enacted.  Gaps between poorer and richer areas also improved in many individual 
outcomes, although these cannot be so readily attributed to neighbourhood policy per 
se.  All gaps remained large in 2010, suggesting that  Blair’s vision was not fully 
realised: which is, perhaps, not surprising in the context of sustained income 
inequalities.  
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Introduction 
Since 2010 there have been dramatic changes to the approach of central government 
in England to the ‘regeneration’ or ‘renewal’ of deprived neighbourhoods. In moves 
that reflect not only deficit reduction policies, but the government’s desire to reduce 
the size of the central state and give greater power and responsibility to local 
communities, all of the major funding streams supporting regeneration in 2010 have 
since been discontinued, along with many of the institutions and mechanisms 
established by Labour: area agreements between central and local government, 
regional spatial strategies, Government Offices for the regions and Regional 
Development Agencies.  Instead, the new government has focused much more on 
stimulating growth to enable regeneration, with central government in a “strategic and 
supportive role” (Department for Communities and Local Government 2011, no page 
number). Mechanisms include the Regional Growth Fund, New Homes Bonus, 
reforms of the planning system and investments in infrastructure projects such as the 
high speed rail network, Crossrail and the Olympic legacy. The goal is that “local 
economies prosper, parts of the country previously over-reliant on public funding see 
a resurgence in private sector enterprise and employment, and that everyone gets to 
share in the resulting growth” (ibid, no page number). At the same time, local 
regeneration activity is seen as “driving economic growth and helping local leaders to 
strengthen their communities and support people back into work” (ibid, no page 
number). To enable this, the government is removing ringfencing of local government 
budgets, enabling local pooling of budgets, and encouraging the co-production of 
services by community and voluntary organisations as part of the ‘Big Society’.  The 
approach of the English government contrasts with the situation in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, where central government commitments to neighbourhood 
renewal programmes have been reaffirmed.  
 
The impact of these policy changes, in combination with the effects of recession and 
muted recovery, is one of the key topics investigated by the Social Policy in a Cold 
Climate research programme. In addition to tracking policy and spending changes, we 
are analysing neighbourhood-level changes in poverty and deprivation before and 
after the Coalition took office, using a variety of area typologies and metrics.  In this 
paper we put this in context by looking back at the period 1997-2010. To enable a 
detailed comparison with what is happening now, we set out the previous 
government’s policy approach, and assess its results. How did Labour approach 
deprived neighbourhoods, and what did it achieve? What legacy did it leave for the 
Coalition to inherit? A full comparison of all four constituent countries of the UK is 
beyond the scope of a single paper. This paper therefore focuses on England, which 
has experienced the most substantial policy shifts over the period in question as well 
as being the UK’s largest country. A companion paper (Lupton, forthcoming) 
provides a full comparative analysis of policy developments in England, Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales.  
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Policy Goals 
As Glennerster and Hills (1998) note, some areas of social policy, such as health, are 
characterised by long-term consistency in their overall goals while in others, such as 
education, the fundamental purposes of policy intervention, not just the content of the 
policies themselves, are often politically contested at any one time and also seem to 
undergo periodic shifts of political consensus.  Neighbourhood renewal certainly 
comes into the latter category. Labour’s election in 1997 brought about a steep-change 
in policy from that of the previous Conservative administration, and substantial 
changes were also evident over the Labour period.  We suggest that three distinct 
periods can be identified: the ‘neighbourhood renewal years’ (1997-2003/4), the 
‘transition years’ (2004/5 to 2007) and the ‘transformation years’ (from 2007/8 
onwards). 
 
The early years of the Blair government saw neighbourhood renewal given high 
political priority, backed by extensive new activity and funding.   The impact of de-
industrialisation, suburbanisation, social and technological change and the shrinking 
value (relative to wages) of welfare benefits on the poorest communities had become 
increasingly evident during the late 1980s and 1990s (Davies 1998; A. Power & 
Mumford 1999; Lupton 2003). This resulted, under the Conservatives, in the initiation 
first of City Challenge (in 1991/2) and then of the larger Single Regeneration Budget 
Challenge Fund (SRB) in 1994, both programmes run by the then Department of the 
Environment.  SRB was in itself a more comprehensive approach than previously 
adopted. It rolled up a number of other grants and programmes such as the remnants 
of the Urban Programme and Estate Action into a single fund allocated to local 
partnerships by competitive bidding, either for themed or holistic area regeneration. It 
was a relatively large programme, with over 1000 schemes funded in six annual 
rounds starting in 1995/6, but it was flexible and local. Because of the competitive 
nature of the fund, the distribution of funding depended on capacity for project design 
and bidding as well as deprivation. The scale, duration and content of schemes were 
determined by the local partnerships and government took a hands-off approach to 
management (Rhodes et al. 2007).  
  
Shaw & Robinson (2009) argue that City Challenge and SRB marked a significant 
shift away from the property-led regeneration of the late 1980s to community-centred 
and partnership-based approaches and in this sense ‘provided the foundations’ (p125) 
for Labour’s approach. However, with Labour’s election in 1997, the problems of 
deprived areas were positioned as a matter of much higher political priority, with 
responsibility moved to the centre of government, and with a much more wide-
ranging approach.  Memorably, Blair highlighted the issue in his very first speech as 
Prime Minister at the troubled Aylesbury Estate in Southwark. Disparities between 
neighbourhoods were placed at the centre of the new social exclusion agenda, so 
much so that the first task of the new Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) that Blair launched 
at the Aylesbury Estate was to report on the problems of deprived neighbourhoods. 
From this followed the establishment of eighteen Policy Action Teams (PATS)–
energetic collaborations between civil servants, academics, community leaders and 
2 
 
local professionals to identify the problems and work out how they could be solved. 
The involvement of Whitehall outsiders was a feature of Labour’s early policy making 
(Eisenstadt 2011), bringing a greater connection to problems on the ground and an 
energy and commitment for change. The SEU and the PATS were seemingly able to 
craft a new consensus around what needed to be done, and persuade government to 
back it with increased spending and new ways of working. Their work led to a 
National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR), launched with the aim that 
within 10 to 20 years no-one should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live 
(SEU 2001). Houghton (2010) has observed that this was one of the few explicit 
pledges made by the New Labour government in relation to inequality.   
 
Whether this goal – that neighbourhood disparities should be reduced so much as to 
eliminate any significant problems (for individuals) arising from them – was ever 
intended to be narrowly interpreted and enacted is debatable. As the NSNR Action 
Plan (SEU 2001) acknowledged, some places will always be poorer than others (p24) 
and could therefore be expected to confer more disadvantages. The actual impact of 
these neighbourhood differentials on individual outcomes (i.e. the existence of 
‘neighbourhood effects’ that can make individual disadvantages worse), is disputed.  
Certainly no target could be set in relation to reducing ‘neighbourhood effects’, given 
the patchy nature of the research evidence on neighbourhood effects (van Ham et al. 
2012). Arguably then, the statement that “no-one should be seriously disadvantaged 
by where they live” should be read in a broader way, as a signal of commitment to 
making a drastic improvement to the worst neighbourhoods rather than as a specific 
and measurable goal. Indeed the vision as set out in the Action Plan makes this 
commitment clear. Although some places would continue to be poor, cycles of decline 
could be stopped and prevented from recurring, services should not be worse than in 
other areas, “all neighbourhoods in the country should be free of fear”, and “we 
should not have neighbourhoods where so many people’s number one priority is to 
move out” ( SEU 2001 p24).   
 
Despite the visionary zeal with which this was expressed, we would describe this as 
“an ameliorative logic”. A clear rationale was set out for central government 
interventions at the neighbourhood scale to protect the residents of deprived areas 
from the worst consequences of economic and social inequality in order to provide 
greater geographical equity in the distribution of services, opportunities, and 
economic and social goods (such as health, safety of people and property, and 
neighbourhood conditions and amenities). These neighbourhood level interventions 
went alongside policies of regional economic development although not, as various 
critics have pointed out, broader economic and fiscal policies to address growing 
inequalities in the economy and society as a whole (S. Power et al. 2005). In the light 
of later developments, the motivation for this approach merits scrutiny. Policy 
documents from this time indicate that architects of neighbourhood renewal policy 
saw its prime rationale as social justice or fairness, with economic efficiency 
arguments also featuring, but in second place. A big part of the problem was seen as 
the failure of central and local government: failure to tackle local economic problems; 
to promote safe and stable communities; to provide good core public services such as 
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schools; to involve communities; to show leadership and work jointly; and to collect 
and use information (SEU 2001 p18). Poor services and conditions, it was argued, 
made it worse to be on a low income, and “people on low incomes should not have to 
suffer conditions and services that are failing and so different from what the rest of the 
population receives” (ibid p 8). There is evidence here of a sense of injustice and a 
demand for the rights of the least advantaged to be recognised.  In this sense we do 
not wholly agree with critics who have positioned Labour’s neighbourhood renewal 
policies as arising from a social integrationist or moral underclass discourse that 
blamed people in low income neighbourhoods for their own situation and put 
responsibility onto them to reintegrate themselves into society through upskilling and 
participating in regeneration activities (Watt 2000).  
 
In support of the overall vision, two long-term goals were set. The first was absolute: 
to have less worklessness, less crime, better health, better skills, and better housing 
and physical environments in all the poorest neighbourhoods. The second was 
relative: to narrow the gap on these measures between the most deprived 
neighbourhoods and the rest of the country. These were supported by a set of ‘floor 
targets’ (see Tables 4, 5 and 6 and later discussion for detail) described as “the social 
equivalent of the Minimum Wage” (NRU website1) ensuring that “no longer will the 
poorest areas and groups go unnoticed.” In practice the targets included both floor and 
convergence goals.  
 
Significantly, housing and environment were added to the list of goals following 
extensive consultation, in recognition of “the poor state of housing and the physical 
environment in many deprived areas, and the part it plays in social exclusion” (SEU 
2001 p25) (Power, A. 2007). The final list therefore gave rise to different kinds of 
interventions: those that were primarily focused on places in order to facilitate 
improvement in individual outcomes (e.g. environmental and housing improvements); 
those that were focused on improving individual outcomes directly (e.g. employment 
advice and training); those that targeted individuals in order to improve places (e.g. 
dealing with anti-social behaviour); and those that were focused on people and places 
simultaneously and the interactions between them (e.g. multi-faceted area 
regeneration programmes) (Griggs et al. 2008). The incorporation of all these goals 
reflected the government’s recognition that individual circumstances are in part 
constituted by place, and also that individual circumstances, choices and behaviours 
are constitutive of place characteristics. People and place are linked in the concept of 
social exclusion. As we shall see, a significant proportion of the spending ended up 
going towards housing, environment and amenities, although the majority of the 
targets focused on individual outcomes not on these place improvements per se, with 
the result that official measurements of success do not capture the holistic nature of 
the intentions and activities.  
 
1 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060530091128/http://neighbourhood.gov.uk/pag
e.asp?id=585 Accessed 9th March 2012 
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The new neighbourhood renewal approach essentially continued throughout John 
Prescott’s terms of office in charge of communities and local government (until 2006) 
and during Ruth Kelly’s brief term in 2006/07. Following a review of progress by the 
Strategy Unit in the Cabinet Office in 2004 (Cabinet Office 2004), the Prime Minister 
still identified poor housing and environments and key public services performing 
poorly “so that deprived areas do not receive adequate support relative to their needs” 
(p8) as key issues that needed to be tackled, and reaffirmed the original vision and 
goals of the NSNR. However, towards the latter part of the period, the analysis of the 
problem began to shift, and with it the emphasis put on different policy goals. For this 
reason, we describe the period from 2004-7 as ‘the transition years’.  
 
Two main shifts were evident. One was that more emphasis began to be given to the 
importance of economic outcomes, with ‘worklessness’ emerging as a central term in 
policy documents. As early as 2004, the Cabinet Office review positioned ‘low levels 
of economic activity’ (p12) as one of the three main drivers of area-based deprivation 
– a distinct discursive shift from the “mass joblessness as the result of several 
recessions and the decline of manufacturing industry” to which the SEU (2001 p 17) 
had alluded. Its report recommended that Regional Development Agencies should 
give greater priority to “reducing worklessness and promoting enterprise in deprived 
areas” (p18). Second, and linked, borrowing from the US ‘concentrated poverty’ 
literature, there was also more focus on ‘concentrated deprivation’ and on the need to 
introduce greater social mix in order to make deprived communities sustainable in the 
long term. Lupton & Tunstall (2008) have noted the increasing emphasis given to the 
spatial ordering of problems, not as a manifestation of structural deficiencies, but in 
terms which emphasised the spatial behaviour of people, such as ‘concentration’ and 
‘clustering’, and the emergence of arguments that, where the poor cluster, 
communities necessarily fail, despite the best efforts of ameliorative interventions by 
the state. As David Miliband put it “We know that communities with a high 
concentration of single tenure, low income residents have not worked in the past and 
will not work in the future” (quoted in Weaver 2006). The idea that communities 
needed to be mixed and balanced in order to be sustainable also emerged from the 
Sustainable Communities Plan (SCP) which introduced a broader vision to create 
sustainable communities – places where people want to live – that promote 
opportunity and a better quality of life for all.” (ODPM 2004), in which the earlier 
focus on the most deprived neighbourhoods became subsumed. Overall, while the 
policy goal might have remained notionally the same, the rationale for reducing 
neighbourhood disparities seemed to be shifting from equity to efficiency.  Rather less 
emphasis was being given to the long term ameliorative role of the state and rather 
more to the need to create functioning labour and housing markets that would enable 
self-sustaining neighbourhoods, and, therefore, neighbourhoods that would not require 
repeated state intervention. Discursively at least, the characteristics and behaviours of 
residents (‘worklessness’, ‘barriers’, ‘concentration’) were gaining more prominence, 
as structural arguments receded. At the same time, the broader discourse of social 
exclusion was also changing. The rising economic tide and the apparent success of 
early policies gave rise to an increasing focus on the very worst off groups, a 
development that was also mirrored in neighbourhood renewal in discussions around 
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sharpening interventions to focus on areas in danger of reaching tipping points or not 
being picked up by housing and labour market recovery (Meen et al. 2005). 
 
The advent of Gordon Brown as Prime Minister in in 2007 heralded a much more 
fundamental shift in policy goals, from social justice and amelioration to economic 
competitiveness and transformation. While Brown was still at the Treasury, he 
instigated a review of sub-national economic development and regeneration (HM 
Treasury. 2007) led by John Healey. The review concluded that substantial progress 
had been made in reducing spatial disparities, but that the gaps were still too large, 
particularly in relation to worklessness. Interventions were not always coordinated, 
nor at the right spatial scale, clear in their objectives and sufficiently well targeted.  
 
Most importantly, the review redefined regeneration and its purpose, in economic 
terms. Regeneration was defined as the “process of reversing physical, economic and 
social decline in an area where market forces will not do this without intervention” 
(p14), and its purpose was first and foremost to improve economic efficiency. The 
document stated clearly that in an efficient market, there would inevitably be 
inequalities between neighbourhoods. However, these would normally be corrected by 
market mechanisms (such as investors moving to cheaper areas). State intervention 
should be considered in order to correct market failures through provision of better 
public goods, information or coordination to enhance investment and enable all areas 
to achieve their economic potential. Although an equity rationale was also mentioned, 
this too was framed in economic terms. Returning all areas to market functionality 
would benefit people with “barriers to full mobility” (between areas) and who were 
therefore “most likely to suffer disproportionately from large spatial differences in 
economic performance”. Absent from the review was any trace of the social justice 
rationale that had motivated the NSNR, its emphasis on public services or its belief in 
greater community ownership of decision-making. Neighbourhood interventions were 
needed, the review concluded, but should be aimed at sustainable economic 
transformation not improving conditions per se. They should have “a stronger 
emphasis on tackling worklessness and a stronger link to wider economic 
interventions” (p21). Following Brown’s move to No 10, Healey moved to CLG, 
where he put the recommendations of the review into place in a new Regeneration 
Framework (CLG 2009). This set out three goals for regeneration (p5): improving 
economic performance, improving rates of work and enterprise and creating 
sustainable places where people want to live and work and businesses want to invest. 
It stressed supply side problems (such as poor skills, lack of social networks and 
welfare dependency) as the cause of concentrations of worklessness. In contrast to the 
earlier policy documents which had advocated a greater alignment of spending and 
services to need, the Regeneration Framework set out a specific ambition to reduce 
the cost to the taxpayer of “subsidising rather than transforming lives”. This 
completed the shift in policy goals that we summarise in Table 1. 
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Table 1:Summary: Phases of Neighbourhood Renewal Policy in England 1997 - 
2010 
 
Neighbourhood 
Renewal Years 
(1997-2003/4) 
Transition Years 
(2004/5 to 2007) 
 
Transformation 
Years 
(2007/8 to 2010) Dominant Analysis of problem Economic restructuring Public service failure 
Public service failure Market failure  Market failure Dominant Logics for intervention Amelioration Equity Amelioration Transformation Equity Efficiency 
Transformation Efficiency 
Scale of intervention Neighbourhood Neighbourhood Local Authority Functional economic areas (e.g. cities, subregions) 
Functional economic areas (e.g. cities, subregions)  Local Authority Neighbourhood 
 
In this series of papers, we are concentrating principally on what happened, not on 
why it happened. However, it is worth noting that these developments in policy are 
connected to a series of interwoven debates about the purpose of neighbourhood 
renewal type policies that have occupied academics and policy-makers at least since 
the late 1960s. Labour’s engagement with academic evidence brought these debates to 
the forefront of policy-making again in the late 1990s and 2000s.  
 
In brief, the issues here are as follows: 
 Whether places do in fact exert any influence on individual outcomes (so called 
‘area effects). See Tunstall & Lupton (2010) and Cheshire (2012) for recent 
reviews of this evidence. 
 Whether there is any point in intervening to improve places, or undertaking 
place-based interventions that support people, if area effects are small. A paper 
by Smith (1999) sets out various alternative rationales for such interventions 
such as equity and pragmatism in delivery, but these are less susceptible to 
economic evaluation (outcomes delivered for inputs made). 
 Whether, if the aim is to improve individual outcomes, programmes targeted at 
specific places are effective or efficient, given that many of the poor live 
outside poor areas and that those who benefit from place-based interventions 
are likely to move out (Tunstall & Lupton 2003) 
 Whether neighbourhood level interventions can have any impact on spatial 
inequalities in the light of wider economic forces. If not, whether the role of the 
state should be a) to intervene at a macro level through economic and fiscal 
policies to redress wider inequalities b) to promote the efficient operation of 
housing and labour markets and enable people to move to places of greater 
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opportunity or c) to ameliorate the conditions of people living in areas of 
market failure. 
 
Policies 
The actual policies enacted reflect the shifts in policy goals although not with a 
perfect correlation. Policies also reflect political and financial constraints, and new 
policies are overlaid on old resulting in a much muddier picture of actual activity than 
changes in ideology alone would suggest. 
 
Neighbourhood Renewal Years 1997-2003/4 
Policy in ‘the neighbourhood renewal years’ can itself be divided into two periods.  
Initial activity, while the PATs were at work and the National Strategy was being 
formulated, consisted of new programmes targeted at specific areas: the New Deal for 
Communities (NDC), Sure Start, Employment Zones, Health and Education Action 
Zones. NDC was Labour’s ‘flagship’ area regeneration programme – concentrated 
activity in just 39 small areas, averaging just under 10,000 residents each - and 
including substantial investments in place and service infrastructure (schools and 
colleges, community buildings, health centres and transport), as well as programmes 
directed at existing residents individually. Although housing was not originally part of 
the programme, many local partnerships quickly prioritised this issue. NDC was 
distinctive from previous area based funding schemes in its length (10 years), the 
scale of central funding (£50m per area), the establishment of community-led 
partnerships to design and deliver the programmes, and the existence of a ‘Year Zero’ 
for partnerships to consult and plan before spending any money. Critically, the money 
was also allocated by central government to selected areas, rather than decided on the 
basis of a bidding competition. However, Labour did also continue with SRB funding, 
with new annual rounds through to 2000/01. Following the end of SRB, some funds 
previously earmarked for further rounds were channelled into a ‘single pot’ of 
regeneration funding run by the Regional Development Agencies. 
 
The second phase was marked by the introduction of the NSNR in 2001. This aimed 
to impact across six main domains: employment, education, health, housing, livability 
and crime, and to rely not on short term programmes and grants, but on directing the 
existing activities and spending of the welfare state (the ‘mainstream’) towards 
deprived neighbourhoods. Overall there were three main forms of intervention: central 
government interventions, local neighbourhood renewal strategies (supported by new 
central government funds) and the specific activities and programmes of the new 
Neighbourhood Renewal Unit. A crucial underpinning to all of these was investment 
in development of small area administrative data, a web-based Neighbourhood 
Statistics service, and the creation of the new Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD), 
which aimed to capture individual and place-based elements of disadvantage, enabling 
the systematic identification of ‘worst areas’ and the tracking of disparities at the 
small area level for the first time. 
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Potentially the most influential for differences in individual social outcomes were 
interventions of the first kind: those by central government departments such as those 
to improve health outcomes in the poorest areas, target crime reduction activity or 
improve education and early years provision. We do not describe or examine these in 
detail here since they are the subject of the other papers in this series. Examples 
include Excellence in Cities and Building Schools for the Future (education), the 
Spearhead Areas (health), Sure Start programme (early years) and the Street Robbery 
Initiative (crime). Other initiatives to target individual disadvantage such as the New 
Deals for the unemployed, changes to benefits and tax credits, the Supporting People 
programme and action on rough sleeping would also impact the poorest 
neighbourhoods more. The NRU was established to have a cross-government role 
working with departments to identify, design and implement area-targeted 
programmes. In accordance with Labour’s wider approach of setting outcome targets, 
‘floor targets’ were established to hold government departments to account on these 
commitments, Neighbourhood Renewal teams were established in the Government 
Offices for the Regions to coordinate implementation.  
 
At the local level, new Local Strategic Partnerships in 91 local authorities with very 
deprived neighbourhoods were tasked with developing local renewal strategies and 
implementing these with support from a new Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF). 
NRF covered districts containing 90 per cent of the neighbourhoods in the poorest 
tenth of the IMD, compared with the NDC which covered just 3 per cent, showing the 
intention to transform government’s approach to poorer neighbourhoods in general, 
rather than to target only the very worst with short-term initiatives. Each local 
authority determined its own strategy, the priorities given to each of NSNR domains, 
and the extent to which it targeted specific neighbourhoods or spread money more 
evenly. 
 
A third kind of intervention was a set of specific programmes run by the new NRU 
and focusing mainly on neighbourhood conditions and capacity building, including 
Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders, Neighbourhood Wardens, and Community 
Empowerment Networks. Earlier work in CASE has reported on these (Power, A. 
2007).  
 
In sum, NSNR was much more than a set of additional spending programmes. It was 
more fundamentally about changing the way that central and local government 
approached neighbourhood disparities. The new floor targets reflected the 
redistributive intentions of the NSNR’s architects. According to the NRU they were 
“an advance in how Government tackles disadvantage” ensuring “a certain level of 
standards for all, because for the first time Government departments, local authorities 
and other service providers are being judged on their performance in the areas where 
they are doing worst, rather than on the national average”. Through the NSNR, a new 
machinery was established in central government, the regions and localities for 
organising and delivering neighbourhood-level interventions and monitoring their 
outcomes. There was an expectation that funding for services would need to be ‘bent’ 
towards poorer areas for sustained periods, if not indefinitely, partly in order to 
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customise services to the needs of specific populations (for example, building 
capacity, providing specialised services for certain migrant or refugee groups). This 
was partly in order to meet additional demands and needs for ongoing public services 
(for example, more funding for schools in poorer neighbourhoods), and partly to 
equalise conditions and opportunities, reflecting the inability of people in poorer areas 
to pay for valued goods from private providers (for example, food co-operatives, tool 
banks, youth facilities and play areas, IT equipment and training). Thus rather than 
relying on specific short-term initiatives, the ‘mainstream’ responses of local 
authorities and central government departments would, over time, become more 
targeted and fitted to poorer areas. This was a crucial change. And although various 
critics have argued that it amounted to little in practice (Perrons & Skyers 2003; Fuller 
& Geddes 2008; Imrie & Raco 2003), there was also, in all Labour’s early 
programmes, a strong emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ regeneration, with community 
members being empowered to take key decisions (Marinetto 2003).  
 
That these reforms represented a very substantial change in approach is not in doubt. 
It is less evident that there was a well-established theory of change, understood across 
government, about how exactly the new mechanisms would achieve the desired 
outcomes. More likely this was a vision, with a developing programme, rather than a 
mature policy machine at the outset. 
   
Transition Years 2004/5 to 2007 
These policies continued during the transition years of the mid-2000s. The 2004 
spending review reaffirmed the initial commitments to floor targets, and indeed 
sharpened them with the introduction of the IMD enabling a clearer focus on the most 
deprived small areas rather than electoral wards or local authorities. This period also 
saw many of the specific grants and programmes, initiated in 2001 and run by central 
government, being rolled into new performance management and funding 
arrangements with local government - the Local Area Agreements, by which local 
authorities could have more discretion over the use of funds, provided that they met 
specific targets agreed with Westminster. From 2007-08, NRF operated through 
LAAs, supported by a centrally-funded data hub for identification and monitoring. 
Programme funding for neighbourhood management, wardens and community 
networks were absorbed into a new Safer Stronger Communities Fund (SSCF). NRU 
itself was moved into a broader group within the department called ‘Tackling 
Disadvantage’ (which also included the Social Exclusion Unit and Housing and 
Homeless Support), and its spending ceased to be separately identified in 
departmental reports. 
 
On the one hand, these developments signalled a ‘new localism’ in which 
responsibilities for identifying and addressing the problems of the most deprived 
neighbourhoods moved more firmly to the local level. However the new emphasis on 
transforming economic outcomes and on sustainable housing markets also led to the 
adoption of new, more strategic, programmes at wider spatial scales, notably the 
Housing Market Renewal programme, which established nine sub-regional 
partnerships (with another three added later) to tackle low demand and housing 
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abandonment, rebalancing housing markets over a period of 10-15 years. The HMR 
projects were principally focused on demolition and housing refurbishment, although 
they also included programmes akin to those in the NDCs – local employment and 
training initiatives and environmental improvements for example (Audit Commission 
2009). However in sharp contrast to the NDCs, decision making was very much top-
down rather than community-led (Cole & Nevin 2004) – a consequence of the shift to 
planning at a larger spatial scale. There were other developments too, following the 
Sustainable Communities Plan. One was a new focus on liveability and sustainability, 
very much in keeping with the NSNR’s environmental emphasis. In 2006, the 
‘Cleaner, Safer, Greener’ strategy was announced to improve the quality of public 
open spaces. Another reflected the increasing focus on achieving long term 
transformation of areas by deconcentrating poverty. A new Mixed Communities 
demonstration scheme was initiated (although with no new money) to show how 
deprived communities could be transformed by private sector investment into new 
mixed-tenure housing. Typically such projects involved rebuilding social housing 
estates at higher densities, with the extra homes being built for sale and profits on 
these sales generating subsidy for new or refurbished social housing and community 
facilities (a rather different approach to the poverty ‘dispersal’ approach often taken in 
the US, where estates were rebuilt at lower density, with new private housing 
replacing social housing). The increasing focus on worklessness was reflected in a 
new Local Enterprise Growth Initiative (LEGI) to boost enterprise and investment. 
Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs) were established to handle key large scale 
economic and physical regeneration projects. 
 
Transformation Years 2007-2010 
The years from 2007 saw a further shift in responsibility to local authorities with the 
establishment of the unringfenced Area Based Grant which incorporated both SSCF, 
Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF) (the successor fund to the NRF) and a large 
number of other area-based grants from the departments of health, education, transport 
and others. The NRU was disbanded, as were the floor targets per se – although some 
of these remained as key indicators under a new system of Departmental Strategic 
Objectives. One reading of these changes is that they reflect the success of the NRU in 
having routinised neighbourhood management, multi-agency working and the bending 
of mainstream funds and services towards deprived neighbourhoods. They can also be 
seen as a further move towards localism – local authorities could now prioritise the 
issues they deemed most important locally. However they are also consistent with the 
subordination of neighbourhood renewal type interventions, with a focus on 
conditions and services, to economic regeneration interventions, and with it, the move 
to bigger spatial scales for decision-making. The new regeneration framework 
emphasised the importance of aligning housing and neighbourhood renewal spend 
with a strategic approach to economic regeneration. Regional Development Agencies 
and the newly formed Homes and Communities Agency (HCA)2 were to have a 
2  The creation of the HCA was in itself a move to integrate economic, physical and housing 
regeneration and to enable a larger scale approach. The new agency brought together the 
investment functions of the Housing Corporation, English Partnerships and parts of CLG in a 
new housing and regeneration agency. 
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‘single conversation’ with local authorities and other partners to identify regional 
priority areas for investment, and move towards a programme approach to funding in 
these areas, rather than funding projects under different housing and regeneration 
schemes, in different areas. The agenda for the HMR programme also shifted away 
from ‘renewal’ towards supporting economic growth (Audit Commission 2009; 
Ferrari 2007). City-region planning was promoted, and authorities encouraged to 
develop Multi-Area Agreements (MAAs) with central government. The 
neighbourhood was no longer government’s starting point for considering 
neighbourhood problems and spatial inequalities or their solutions. 
 
The NRF was replaced by a new Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF) more closely 
targeted towards 65 local authorities selected on indicators of the proportion of people 
out of work and claiming benefits. Unlike NRF, WNF was unringfenced and could be 
used how local authorities saw fit to meet the worklessness targets agreed in their 
LAAs. As with NRF, the inherent local autonomy makes it impossible to identify the 
totality of activity under the programme. No doubt some authorities would have 
continued existing NRF-funded programmes, but given them a more employment-
related emphasis as opposed to starting a wholly new set of activities. An early review 
suggested some dilution of the focus on area deprivation. Most but not all LAs were 
still targeting particular neighbourhoods under WNF, but in most cases this was not 
exclusive – funds could be spent to get people into work wherever they lived. The 
most common use of the funds was for supply-side initiatives – helping people 
become more employable and get a job (University of Cambridge 2010).   
 
Public Spending on Neighbourhood Renewal in England 
That the expansion was accompanied by a significant increase in spending over that of 
the previous government is not in doubt. However, the design of NSNR, with its 
three-pronged approach (central government mainstreaming, NRF and local 
government mainstreaming, and NRU initiatives) makes the sum of spending on 
neighbourhood renewal impossible to establish. Data on spending on identifiable 
NRU initiatives and the NRF programmes can be culled from evaluation reports, 
departmental annual reports and local authority revenue budget data, although these 
different sources are inconsistent over time and with each other. Moreover, these 
initiatives and programmes are only part of the story, and not all of the other work of 
central government departments in redistributing effort towards poorer 
neighbourhoods is identifiable. Some of it will have spent on identifiable targeted 
initiatives, such as the Deprived Areas Fund in DWP and Excellence in Cities in 
education; more will have spent through a range of much smaller grants to local 
authorities, many of them later rolled up in Area-Based Grant; and much more 
through the various funding formulae by which central government allocates funding 
to local authorities on the basis of need. Changes in the amounts spent on area-based 
programmes may reflect changes in the balance between targeted and mainstream 
funding rather than real changes in the amounts different areas are receiving. We 
therefore approach the question of ‘how much was spent?’ in two ways - by giving 
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indicative data of the size of different programmes over time, and by assessing the 
extent to which central government allocations to local government, overall, became 
more redistributive to areas of deprivation. Note that neither of these analyses count 
spending on the government machinery that was established : the Neighbourhood 
Renewal Unit, regional infrastructure, information and statistics. 
 
Table 2 shows the indicative sizes of Labour’s main programmes3, and the SRB which 
it inherited from the Conservatives. SRB was in itself a significant programme. By 
adding NDC and NRF alone, Labour more than doubled annual expenditure from 
2001/02. Expenditure on these main programmes peaked around 2007.  
 
Table 2: Size of Labour's Main Neighbourhood Renewal Programmes 
Programme Dates Approximate 
Annual Cost 
(£million) 
Number and Scale of Areas 
included 
SRB 1995/6 to 2006/7 520 1028 schemes ranging from 
local authority ward to 
combinations of Local 
Authorities 
NDC 1999/00 to 2009/10 200 39 neighbourhoods 
NRF/WNF 2001/02 to 2010/11 500 95 local authorities at peak 
HMR 2003/4 to 2010/11 275 12 subregional housing 
markets comprising parts of 
28 local authorities 
Local Enterprise 
Growth Initiative 
(LEGI) 
2005/06 to 2010/11 70 30 local authorities 
 
NRF/WNF made up the largest single share of the new funding, about one third at the 
peak. Housing Market Renewal had cost about £2.2bn by 2010/11, and NDC, targeted 
at just 39 small areas of up to 10,000 people each, was the next largest programme at 
about £2 billion, far eclipsing the smaller NRU programmes on neighbourhood 
wardens, neighbourhood management and community capacity building (worth about 
£45m a year between them between 2001/2 and 2004/5).  
 
The broad coverage of some of these programmes meant that their value compared 
with overall local government spending, and with spending on other major public 
services, was small. At its peak in 2007/8, NRF made up less than 1% (0.8%) of the 
total funds distributed to local authorities by central government to provide services 
(Aggregate External Finance or AEF), and was worth on average between £66 and 
£120 per head in the neighbourhoods affected.4 By way of contrast, central 
3  The smaller NRU programmes including Neighbourhood Wardens and Neighbourhood 
Management are not included here because of their small size. 
4  Author’s calculation based on the following assumptions: a) that all NRF monies received by 
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government health spending per head per year in England amounted to £1631 in 
2007/8. 
 
Seen another way, hovever, it is evident that NRF did provide substantial new 
capacity for action, especially in smaller, extensively deprived authorities. If, instead 
of looking at the overall value of the fund compared with other funds, we look at the 
allocations to individual local authorities, a different picture emerges. Again looking 
at the peak expenditure year 2007/08, NRF allocations averaged about £5.7 million 
for London Boroughs, £9.3m for metropolitan districts, £6.1m for other unitary 
authorities and £1.7m for non-unitary district councils. Table 3 shows that this 
allocation was equivalent to about 7% of local authority spending in that year, 
excluding spending on education and social services. There was substantial variation. 
For example in Croydon, a highly populated London borough with pockets of extreme 
deprivation, NRF accounted for only 1% of expenditure, compared with 31% of 
expenditure in Easington, a small extensively deprived authority. On this basis, one 
could expect the withdrawal of NRF or similar funds to have significant impact on 
local authority activity in deprived neighbourhoods. The same is certainly true for 
NDC funding, which was much more substantial on a per capita basis (£500 per 
resident per year for the life of the programme (Foden et al. 2010 p2)).  
 
Table 3: Average Value of NRF allocations to different types of local authorities 
2007/08  Number receiving NRF Average Allocation £m NRF as % of all service spend NRF as % of all service spend except education and social services London Boroughs 19 5.7 1.2 5.0 Metropolitan Districts 31 9.3 1.7 7.8 Shire Districts 20 1.7 9.6 9.6 Unitary Authorities 16 6.1 1.9 6.9 All 86  3.3 7.1 
 
Sources: Authors' calculations from NRF allocation from Parliamentary Question. Services 
Expenditure from CIPFA Finance and General Statistics, compiled from LA returns. 
 
  
local authorities were allocated to neighbourhood-based spending (in reality, some would 
have been retained for central services) and b) that these funds were all allocated to 
neighbourhoods within these local authorities which were in the most deprived 10% (higher 
figure) or 20% (lower figure) on the IMD. On these assumptions, some authorities could have 
spent about £300-400 per head if targeting just the 10% worst neighbourhoods, and others as 
little as £15.  
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Taking a broader view, it is clear that the sum of these larger programmes, other new 
and targeted initiatives and a review of the basic ‘formula grant’ to local authorities 
resulted in a greater share of central government funding going to poorer areas. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the total central government revenue funding (per head of 
population) going to local authorities in 1998/99, 2001/2, 2005/6 and 2008/9, in real 
terms(2008/9 prices), adjusted for economy-wide (GDP) inflation. We take the ‘total 
central government revenue funding’ to include formula grant, Area-Based Grant and 
all special and specific grants to local authorities, with the exception of those that are 
provided to finance mandatory payments that local authorities must process on behalf 
of central government, such as housing benefits or council tax benefits. Authorities 
are divided into two groups reflecting the different division of responsibilities : lower 
tier district councils; and unitary authorities (including London Boroughs and the 
former metropolitan districts) which also have responsibility for education and social 
services.5  Each group is divided into quintile groups depending on their rank in the 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation most closely corresponding to the year for which the 
financial data is reported.  
 
The analysis shows, firstly, that more funding in 1998/9 was already distributed to the 
poorer LAs. On average, the most deprived fifth of unitary authorities received an 
extra 68% per head and districts an extra 62% per head. This gap widened slightly.  
For the unitary authorities, London Boroughs and Metropolitan Districts, the change 
was relatively small: a shift to a ratio of 1.73:1 by the end of the period. The second 
quintile group also pulled away slightly. For districts the trend was more pronounced, 
with the most deprived fifth of authorities pulling away markedly from the rest, 
ending with an extra 83% funding (or £65 per head) over the least deprived 
authorities, compared with 62% (£40 per head) at the start.  In both cases, although 
real terms funding continued to increase throughout the period, the closing of the gap 
happened almost entirely up until 2005/6 (in our data), with little further redistribution 
in the last period. 
 
  
5  This analysis does not include County Councils because it is district councils which have 
responsibility for neighbourhood renewal.  
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Figure 1: Central Government Revenue Funding per Head: District Councils 
1998/9 to 2008/9 
 
 
Figure 2: Central Government Revenue Funding per Head: Unitary Authorities 
and London Boroughs 1998/9 to 2008/9  
 
 
Sources for Fig. 1and 2  
LA financial data: DCLG Revenue Accounts; 
Deprivation Measure: ONS Indices of Deprivation Local Authority Summaries  
Population Estimates for Per Capita Figures: ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates, all persons. 
For further detail see research note at 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case/_new/research/Social_Policy_in_a_Cold_Climate/Programme_Reports_a
nd_event_information.asp 
 
  
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
160.0
1998/99 2001/02 2005/06 2008/09
M
ea
n 
re
ve
nu
e/
he
ad
 (£
) 
Districts - Revenue by IMD deprivation quintile 1998/99 - 
2008/09 
1 - most
deprived
2
3
4
5 - least
deprived
16 
 
Inputs and Outputs  
What did this money buy, in terms of capital projects, extra staff, goods and services 
(inputs), and what was produced or delivered as a result (outputs)? This is perhaps a 
particularly important question in relation to neighbourhood renewal. Typically in 
analyses of the welfare state we would regard these inputs and outputs as the means to 
better individual outcomes. However, given the early policy goals of improving 
services, amenities and conditions in poor areas in the name of social justice, these 
inputs (neighbourhood wardens, for example) and outputs (better homes and 
environments, for example) might also be considered ends in themselves. 
Nevertheless, the same complexity of delivery that makes it hard to identify spending 
also inhibits comprehensive counting of inputs and outputs Again we construct a 
broad picture using a variety of sources including programme evaluations and data on 
trends in neighbourhood housing, environment and services. 
 
Substantial evaluation reports on NRF and NDC describe what was done under these 
programmes, although they do not provide any comprehensive count of additional 
inputs and outputs.  In the end, NDC became largely a programme based around 
physical transformation of areas, and community capacity building. Housing and 
physical environment projects accounted for the largest share of NDC spending (32 
per cent), followed by community (18%) and education (17%). Spending on 
immediate economic outcomes (getting people into work) and health made up a 
relatively small share (12% and 11% respectively), with crime reduction at 10% 
(Batty et al. 2010). Cowen & Wilton (2008) and Amion Consulting (2010) concurred 
that about a third of NRF money went on housing, environment and community safety 
initiatives, 18-20% on education (including pupil and teacher support and volunteer 
involvement), 15-16% on health (including advice, referrals and access to services), 
11-13% on worklessness (including information and advice, training and work 
placements) and the rest on cross cutting activities including community capacity 
building. Our own review of reports from local authorities selected to represent a 
range of high, medium and low NRF recipients reveals some examples: in South 
Tyneside a ‘Supporting People into Work’ programme helping 1257 people into jobs 
from 2004 to 2006 at a cost per job of £1605 and an anti-poverty programme which 
helped people claim benefit entitlements and save on debt repayments by establishing 
a credit union; in Hastings the provision of Street Wardens and the establishment of a 
dedicated community policing team; in Kensington and Chelsea environmental 
improvements, an alcohol referral service, a community literacy coordinator, a 
burglary reduction project, establishing some small business units, and provision of IT 
equipment for the voluntary sector (Audit Commission 2007; Kensington and Chelsea 
Partnership Steering Group 2007; Clive Jacotine and Associates Limited and Nick 
Wates Associates 2004; Special Interest Group of Municipal Authorities 2007). 
 
NRF funds were used to supplement existing mainstream activities and develop new 
programmes and ways of working. The evaluation found that NRF money had been 
largely effective in giving local authorities and partners increased flexibility to spend 
and experiment across thematic areas, increasing the visibility of neighbourhood 
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renewal as a priority for service providers, and encouraging mainstream agencies to be 
more attentive to need in the poorest areas and more assiduous in ensuring that the 
services they provided were of equivalent quality. According to the evaluation, two-
thirds of the outputs and outcomes from NRF would not have occurred without the 
programme. By way of example, in Birmingham, NRF was used to fund police 
overtime, neighbourhood policing and extra police to undertake specific operations 
addressing floor targets. It also funded a pilot free swimming scheme under the 
‘health and well-being’ theme, later taken on by the local authority. One survey of 
local authorities found a case of 60% of NRF funds being spent on mainstream 
activities, although this was unusually high. Some authorities also used NRF to 
establish greater participatory budgeting and local decision-making. For example, 
Kirklees established a ‘People’s Purse’ - funds ring-fenced for community and 
voluntary groups working or based in the Neighbourhood Renewal target areas, and 
Birmingham established a system of ‘ward allocations’ to direct funding to smaller 
projects such as playgrounds, play schemes and outreach youth work which attracted 
less mainstream money. Hastings developed local action plans (LAPs), allowing for 
the customisation of local services – for example establishing street cleansing levels.  
 
This evidence suggests a wide range of new and extended services, varying locally, 
provided as a result of the NRF elements of NSNR. In addition, other central 
government programmes delivered more or improved services and infrastructure. A 
key initiative was the Decent Homes (DH) programme, through which the 
government pledged to bring all social housing to a decent standard by 2010, with 
more than half the improvements being made in the most deprived 117 local 
authorities. DH got off to a slower start than hoped but over 90% of social housing 
had been brought up to standard by 2010. There has been no final report on the 
proportion in deprived local authorities, but given the correlation between social 
housing and poverty, there is no doubt that this programme made a difference to 
conditions in many of the poorest neighbourhoods.6 Housing Market Renewal 
Pathfinders and mixed community initiatives also refurbished thousands of homes and 
built new homes, none of which were directly reported on as part of the floor target 
regime.  
 
In combination, Decent Homes, HMR and other public/private housing regeneration 
schemes contributed to a reduction in vacant homes – one of the key problems 
affecting liveability and contributing to a spiral of decline. There is no published 
analysis of the reduction in vacancies at neighbourhood level. The Audit 
Commission’s report on the HMR programme (Audit Commission 2009) shows only 
a modest decrease in vacant homes nationally (falling from 3.4% of the stock in 2002 
to 3% in 2008), although with bigger reductions in the northern regions which had 
6  The DH programme was initially monitored using two sources: landlord returns and survey 
data from the English House Condition Survey (later EHS). EHCS was chosen as the 
preferred source. The two data sources do not tally, and neither gives an up to date analysis 
by local authority or neighbourhood deprivation. Assuming 50% (the target) of improvements 
in deprived authorities, estimates of the reduction in non-decent homes in such authorities 
would be between quarter and half a million by 2009.  
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higher vacancy rates to start with.  It also shows a big reduction in reported ‘low 
demand’ for housing, with this problem typically more than halving in the same 
period. Our own estimates, at a finer spatial scale, suggest that there were about just 
under 6000 output areas in England with a high rate of vacant properties in 20017. 
Very few of these were in the South of England, outside London, with the exception 
of some unpopular private housing in coastal towns. Very unpopular housing 
neighbourhoods in London were almost all Inner London estates. There was a lot of 
unpopular social housing in the large cities of the North and West. Overall, vacancy 
rates had fallen in these areas by 2007/8, and the trend was sharper in very unpopular 
estates than in mixed housing, consistent with the effect of demolition programmes.8 
Not all of this can be attributed to policy. Greater demand for social housing in a 
context of falling stock turnover, and reversal of population and economic decline in 
some less advantaged cities would also have played a part. The result nevertheless, 
would have been an improvement in living conditions and neighbourhood viability in 
many deprived areas. 
 
Other major programmes included the expansion of childcare services and facilities 
and, towards the end of the latter part of the period, investment in new school 
buildings. Between 1999 and 2003, 524 local Sure Start programmes were set up in 
areas with very high concentrations of children in poverty, providing (typically) good 
quality play, learning and childcare, family support, outreach and home visiting and 
health care and advice. 107 areas, two thirds of them in the 20% most deprived, had 
new Early Excellence Centres, and 45,000 new day care places were provided in 1400 
Neighbourhood Nursery settings in the most deprived 20% of neighbourhoods 
between 2001 and 2004. In 2004, these initiatives were brought together in the roll out 
of Sure Start Children’s Centres, over 3500 in all by the end of Labour’s term in 
office.  Deprived local authorities were also the main beneficiaries of the Building 
Schools for the Future programme, announced in 2004 and intended to be a 15 wave 
programme resulting in the entire secondary school building stock being refurbished 
by 2020. The programme was targeted by deprivation.  
 
At the same time, other increases in public spending almost certainly brought extra 
staff into poorer neighbourhoods, additionally to those funded through NRF. For 
example, the total (FTE) of police constables, special constables and police 
community support officers (PCSOs) rose by 22% between 1997 and 2010, including 
a 13% increase in the number of constables and the introduction of the PCSO scheme 
which had created nearly 17000 additional posts by 2010.9 
 
Given that different programmes affected different but overlapping sets of 
neighbourhoods at different times, it is impossible to quantify the overall expansion in 
services. There is also little evidence on the efficiency of spend or value for money, 
7  Output areas (OAs) have between 40 and 125 households.  
8  These data are from landlord returns, and coverage is incomplete, so we can only estimate 
trends in different kinds of areas, not actual numbers of vacant homes. 
9  Police Service Strength England and Wales 31 March 2011, 31st March 2008, Table 3. 
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except in relation to the NDC programme, where the evaluation also assessed the 
programme’s value for money using two different methods, finding that savings could 
be estimated at between three and five times programme spend.  However, the net 
effect has been widely reported in surveys, evaluations and case studies. The NSNR 
evaluation reports that many residents considered that the streets were cleaner, that the 
quality of parks and open spaces had improved and that environmental conditions 
were better (Amion Consulting 2010). The NDC evaluation reported statistically 
significant evidence of greater improvement than in comparable areas on indicators of 
place – such as perceptions of the environment, being a victim of crime, and 
satisfaction with the area. 18% of people surveyed said that the area had got much or 
slightly better in the last two years (2006-8), compared with 11% in comparator areas, 
which would have also been receiving additional investments in this period (Batty et 
al. 2010).  The Sure Start evaluation reported reductions in burglary, vehicle crime 
and exclusions from school, and increases in creche and day care provision 
(Eisenstadt 2011). Other qualitative studies of low income neighbourhoods have also 
reported residents’ saying that regeneration programmes had resulted in positive 
improvements, although they also point to the diversity of views between and within 
neighbourhoods, and the different views that could be held by the same people. Rapid 
change, perceptions of community decline, and processes of regeneration themselves 
could make people feel less confident and satisfied, while they simultaneously 
welcomed new services and environmental improvements (Bashir & Flint 2010; A. 
Power et al. 2011) 
 
Such measurements as there are also indicate improvements in neighbourhood quality. 
Despite the early policy emphasis on neighbourhood conditions, floor targets in this 
area were weakly specified. The government’s initial targets set in 2000 covered 
crime, but only at the level of the local authority (Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships and Street Crime Initiative areas). Reporting of these data by the Home 
Office was inconsistent (Civitas 2005) and the specific targets to close gaps were 
dropped in CSR 2007. Neighbourhood conditions themselves had no targets until the 
2004 Spending Review, when a very specific set were introduced in relation to litter, 
abandoned cares, environmental quality and ‘liveability’ as reported in surveys. These 
were only reported upon until 2007, when they were replaced by a general indicator 
(but no specific target) on ‘satisfaction with the local area’. Between 2004 and 2007 
there were absolute improvements in the liveability indicators and the gaps between 
deprived areas and others closed (Table 4). On one issue (abandoned cars) there was a 
huge improvement, although this cannot be readily ascribed to policy intervention. A 
contemporaneous rise in the value of scrap metal provided an incentive for people to 
trade rather than abandon their unwanted cars, bikes and vans.   
 
For a longer run overview, and at the neighbourhood level, we look at data on 
domestic burglary, an NSNR priority, and reported neighbourhood problems using 
survey data as well as police recorded crime data.  
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Figure 3: Domestic Burglary Rates 
 
 
Source: BCS from Table 7.01; Recorded crime, calculations from ONS Recorded crime; DCLG 
household projections 
Other neighbourhood problems also appeared to decrease. Figure 4 draws on data from the Survey of 
English Housing/English Housing Survey to show the excess in those reporting specific problems in 
the neighbourhood - crime, litter and vandalism - as ‘serious’ problems in the most deprived 
neighbourhoods, compared with all neighbourhoods. The SEH/EHS data is coded to the 2007 IMD – 
so the analysis here looks at the gap between neighbourhoods in the most deprived 10% on that Index, 
which was based mainly on data collected in 2005. 88% were also in the worst 10% on the 2004 
Index (based mainly on 2001 data), but some were no 88% of them were contained in NRF districts, 
and only 5% in NDC areas.10 These indicators also show a closing of the gap on crime, although this 
is only marginally significant and not capable of analysis over the whole period as the question 
changed from 2008. However there is a larger closing of the gap – about 5%, or a quarter of the 
disparity, for vandalism and litter. This improvement appears to have been sustained up until 2009/10.  
 
Figure 3 compares the rate of burglary per 1,000 households in deprived areas to that 
for all areas. We look both at recorded burglary (crimes that are notified to the police) 
and at reported victimhood from the British Crime Survey (BCS) (which will include 
crimes that are not notified to the police). Recorded crime data are at district level, and 
we identify the districts selected to receive NRF funding, compared with all districts. 
Not all neighbourhoods in all these districts will have received any specific 
neighbourhood renewal interventions on crime reduction. The BCS data is coded to 
the IMD 2004, using quintile groups. We therefore define ‘most deprived 
neighbourhoods’ as those in the 20% most deprived neighbourhoods according to 
IMD 2004. 82% of these were in NRF districts. 3% were in NDC areas. The black line 
shows the number of domestic burglaries per ten thousand households in deprived 
10  Thus the ‘most deprived neighbourhoods’ identified here are not an exact fit with the ‘most 
deprived neighbourhoods’ at the start of the period – some of them would have already 
improved slightly – nor an exact fit with the areas targeted by policy. They are a more closely 
defined set of neighbourhoods than the ‘20% most deprived’ used by BCS.  
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areas, as recorded by the British Crime Survey. This fell by almost half, from 80 in 
2001 to 46 in 2009. However, rates of acquisitive crime, including burglary, also fell 
sharply across Britain as a whole in the 2000s. A better measure of the disadvantage 
imposed by living in poor neighbourhoods is the 'relative risk' of victimhood: the 
increase in the probability that a household in a poor neighbourhood will be subject to 
burglary, relative to a household living elsewhere. Both the recorded crime statistics 
and the BCS findings confirm that in the poorest neighbourhoods, the relative risk of 
burglary fell. Most of the closing of the gap occurred in the early 2000s, but was 
largely maintained later in the decade 
 
Figure 4: Percentage Point Gap between People in Most Deprived 
Neighbourhoods and All Neighbourhoods Perceiving Particular Issues to be 
Serious Problems in their Area 
 
 
 
Source: Survey of English Housing/English Housing Survey 
These data seem to suggest that gaps in neighbourhood conditions between the poorest 
neighbourhoods and others did narrow, although there were still substantial differences at the end of 
the period – nearly 20 percentage points on self-report domestic burglary victimisation, 15 for litter 
and more than 10 for vandalism. Moreover, the improvements seemed to continue even after the 
change in policy in 2007. This may suggest a weak link between policy and outcome. Domestic 
burglary rates, for example, may be linked to the economic cycle or to wider government policies not 
spatially targeted, such as New Deals for the unemployed or methadone prescription for heroin 
addicts (Parker et al. 1996). Alternatively it may suggest that sustainable improvements had been 
made either through capital investments in target-hardening, or through the mainstreaming of 
neighbourhood policing and management, such that crime and neighbourhood problems did not rise 
as might be expected during the recession from 2008 onwards. 
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Individual Social and Economic Outcomes 
Lastly we turn to the impact of policies and spending on individual socio-economic 
outcomes for those living in deprived areas. Did outcomes improve, and did gaps 
close between these areas and others. As with ‘liveability’, reporting on the 
government’s own floor targets gives only a partial account. Different departments 
targeted different sets of ‘worst areas’ and the lack of small area data until later in the 
2000s meant that early targets were often set only at the local authority level. Targets 
also changed with each Spending Review. In many cases, new baselines were set or 
new groups of ‘worst areas’ selected, while monitoring of previous time series was 
discontinued. A full time series is not possible. Departments reported on these Labour 
targets for the last time in 2009, often using data from 2008 so the record ends before 
the onset of recession. We therefore supplement these with our own analysis of two 
key indicators: neighbourhood satisfaction (as a measure of whether poor 
neighbourhoods were perceived to be less disadvantageous over time) and 
worklessness (the main focus of policy after 2007). Using publicly available data, we 
are able to construct a longer time series at the neighbourhood level in order to 
monitor change through the period from 2001-2010.  
    
Health and Education 
Looking first at the government’s own targets, we examine health (Table 5) and 
education (Table 6). These targets set were at local authority and school level, not 
neighbourhood. They indicate progress on some indicators, but not on others. To 
2009, the life expectancy gap between areas widened, while those on cancer and 
circulatory diseases narrowed. There were dramatic reductions in numbers of schools 
below the performance thresholds set by government, although the target numbers of 
schools below these thresholds were not met. No progress was made on inequalities at 
the Foundation Stage by 2008, the date of the government’s last report on this issue. 
However there was a rapid improvement thereafter, so that the target was met by 
2010.  
 
Assessing the impact of neighbourhood-level interventions on these trends is difficult. 
In health particularly, demographic, economic and social (lifestyle) changes are 
principal drivers of health outcomes. In both domains, mainstream policies, such as 
the national curriculum strategies, would have been a major part of the story. Parallel 
papers on health and education look more closely at mainstream policies, spending, 
inputs and outputs to tackle inequalities in these areas. In relation to neighbourhood 
programmes, two key health indicators, low birth weights and standardised mortality 
ratios, were among only three indicators on which local authorities in receipt of NRF 
saw no absolute improvement between 2001 and 2007.  
 
In contrast, education was the domain which NRF local authorities saw the biggest 
absolute and relative improvements. The gap in GCSE attainment at 5A*-C between 
LAs in receipt of NRF and the England figure reduced by 71%, Key Stage 2 
attainment by 41% and Key Stage English by 32%. However, schools in these local 
authorities would have been the prime beneficiaries from wider education policies 
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geared towards raising standards and reducing inequalities. The evaluation concludes 
that these interventions are more likely to account for change than NRF itself. The 
NDC evaluation showed that comparator areas – other poor neighbourhoods that 
would have benefited from national and NRF-initiated education interventions 
although not NDC - actually fared better on educational attainment at Key Stage 2 and 
Key Stage 4 than the NDC areas themselves. Indeed it found an inverse relationship 
between NDC education spend and education outcomes, suggesting that the money 
was possibly spent in the wrong way. 
 
Table 5: Floor Targets, Health 
 
 
Table 6: Floor Targets, Education 
  
Target for 2010 Comparison Baseline year Baseline position 2010 Assessment
Gap: Males 2.57 % 
(1.92 years)
Gap: Males 2.61 % (2.05 
years)  Increase of 7%
Gap: Females 
1.77% (1.41 years)
Gap: Females 2% (1.65 
years) Increase of 13%
Reduce the gap in deaths 
from circulatory diseases 
by 40% 
Worst fifth of areas and 
the England average 1995-1997
Gap: 36.37 deaths 
per 100,000
Gap: 20.11 deaths per 
100,000, decrease of 45% Target met early
Reduce the gap in life 
expectancy by 10% 
Worst fifth of areas and 
the England average 1995-1997 Gap widened
Reduce the gap in 
premature cancer deaths 
by 6% 
Worst fifth of areas and 
the England average 1995-1997
Gap: 20.7 deaths 
per 100,000
Gap: 18.33 deaths per 
100,000, decrease of 12% Target met early
Target Comparison Baseline year Baseline position Progress Assessment
Reduce inequalities in levels 
of development at the 
Foundation Stage
30% most disadvantaged 
areas  
2005 Gap 16% 2010: 12% Target met 
2006/07:
2,849 schools below 
target in English
1,484 below target in 
English (-48%)
3,570 schools below 
target in Maths
2,026 below target in Maths 
(-40%)
In all schools at least 50% of 
pupils to achieve Level 5 or 
2002/3 589 schools below 
target
Target was to be reached 
by 2008. By 2007 (last age 
Target not met by 
2007 
71 schools below 
2004 target
2006/07:
186 schools below 
2006 target
17 schools below 2006 
target
343 schools below 
2008 target
64 schools below 2008 
target
Reduce by 40% the 
proportion of schools in which 
fewer than 65% of pupils 
achieve level 4 or above at 
Key Stage 2
2002/3 Target met
In all schools, at least 20% of 
pupils to achieve 5 GCSEs at 
A*-C, rising to 25% by 2006 
and 30% in 2008
2003/04
Target not met by 
2007. No further 
report. Publicly 
available data shows 
that by 2010, 1 
school was below 
target
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Neighbourhood Satisfaction 
Neighbourhood satisfaction might be taken as another indicator, albeit a more 
subjective one, of whether deprived areas were improving relative to others. Figure 5, 
using SEH/EHS data, shows the percentage of respondents who said that they were 
‘slightly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied, in response to the question “How satisfied are you 
with this area as a place to live?”.11 12 Such attitudes are known to be derived from 
perceptions of safety, community spirit, the quality of local services, amongst others, 
as well as being influenced by dwelling condition and neighbourhood composition. In 
other words they appear to be driven by exactly the kinds of things that the 
government was trying to influence through the NSNR. Note that for SEH/EHS, the 
yearly percentages of respondents who perceive problems in poor neighbourhoods 
have 95% confidence intervals of around ±2%. So, small changes need to persist for 
several years for one to attribute them with confidence to real change; differences of 
one or two per cent between single years are not significant. The graph shows that 
from 1999 up until 2007 there was a small, but steady and statistically significant 
decrease in the gap between the poorest and the rest, although not as great as those for 
burglary, vandalism and litter. The gap in the early years, before NSNR had been 
launched, was around 16%; in 2006/2007, after NRF and NDC had been in effect for 
five or more years, it had fallen to around 12%. This corroborates the picture of 
improvements suggested by the short-lived liveability indicators. However, the 
disparity in dissatisfaction re-opened in the final two years of Labour (measured by 
EHS, though in the same form as in SEH). Simply comparing the end to the start, 
there was no significant closing of the gap in neighbourhood satisfaction. 
 
  
11  There are some slight changes in measurement between the Survey of English Housing 
(SEH), which ran until 2008, and the English Housing Survey (EHS), which covers the final 
two years of New Labour, 2008/09 and 2009/10. The question about general neighbourhood 
satisfaction was asked in the same form “How satisfied are you with this area as a place to 
live?” in both surveys, and was asked before prompts about specific problems. In EHS, the 
question was asked directly after questions about tenure and accommodation satisfaction. The 
phrasing of prompts about specific neighbourhood problems varied between the two surveys, 
however (e.g. 'crime' versus 'the general level of crime in the area') 
12  The same broad pattern emerges if only those who are ‘very’ dissatisfied are included. 
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Figure 5: Proportion of People Dissatisfied with Their Neighbourhood as a Place 
to Live 
 
 
Source: Survey of English Housing/English Housing Survey 
 
This increase in the size of the gap in the latter part of the period is somewhat 
surprising, given that neighbourhood satisfaction tends to be closely linked to crime 
and neighbourhood conditions (Parkes et al. 2002; Baum et al. 2010; Permentier et al. 
2011), which showed continued improvement.  It does not appear to be driven by 
changes in the individual economic circumstances of the people living in the poorest 
neighbourhoods. Low-income households and renters consistently rate their 
neighbourhood less well than others. However, even when we control for changes in 
poverty and tenure in poor neighbourhoods over time, the same pattern appears.  It 
may be linked to the change in policy after 2007 - the withdrawal of NRF and the 
reduced visibility of neighbourhood policies and programmes. When we look not just 
at the poorest neighbourhoods but at all neighbourhoods within local authoroity 
districts that received any NRF (i.e poorer local authorities), we see the same steady 
closing of the gap up until 2007, then from then a slight widening between poorer and 
better-off authorities. Importantly, however, looking at this wider set of 
neighbourhoods, the gap at the end of the Labour period was significantly smaller 
than at the start. So gaps between poorer local authorities and others did narrow over 
the period as a whole, while gaps between poorest (more local) neighbourhoods and 
others narrowed but then widened again. 
 
The two sets of data together suggest that the urban authorities receiving NRF 
possibly improved during the whole period as a result of stronger economic 
performance and wider urban policy interventions – the ‘urban renaissance’ that was 
also a feature of early Labour policy – but that the poorest neighbourhoods within 
them only improved relative to other neighbourhoods during the period up to 2007 
when neighbourhood renewal policy created a focus on conditions and the quality of 
services. Certainly the NDC evaluation seems to show that concentrated spending and 
activity does lead to increases in satisfaction. In the NDC areas, there was an increase 
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of 13% in those saying they were very or fairly satisfied with the area compared with 
8% in comparator areas. On the other hand, other factors altogether may drive 
neighbourhood satisfaction - increasing inequality or economic insecurity or housing 
inaffordability, perhaps. Rising expectations can also depress satisfaction (James 
2007). Whatever the reason, it would appear that overall, despite early progress, the 
gap in satisfaction between people in the most deprived neighbourhoods and others 
was not significantly smaller when Labour left office than when it entered it.  
 
Worklessness 
To assess changes in worklessness, we need to employ benefits data. Here we follow 
the method of English Indices of Multiple Deprivation in using the total of Job 
Seekers Allowance and Incapacity Benefit/Serious Disablement Allowance claimants 
(and, latterly, also Employment Support Allowance), divided by the working-age 
population, as a proxy for ‘work deprivation’13.  
 
Figure 6 shows that for all high-worklessness neighbourhoods in England, shown by 
the solid line, there was a steady downward trend in the gap in the work deprivation 
rate from 2000 to 2009. This partly reflects the absorption of marginal labour in poor 
neighbourhoods during a period of economic expansion. We see that the gap between 
all poor neighbourhoods and the rest widened again following the recession; the same 
marginal and casualised labour in poor neighbourhoods was more likely to be laid off. 
However, the gap was still 2.7 percentage points smaller when Labour left office in 
May 2010 than it was at the start of our series.  
 
This trend meant that the government met its floor target. Set for the first time for 
small areas in 2004, this was to reduce the gap in employment for the 903 wards with 
the worst labour market position in Spring 2005 by just one per cent by 2008. This 
was exceeded (a 1.8% percentage point reduction) by the end of 2007.  
 
  
13  It should be noted that the use of IB claims as an unemployment indicator is contentious, and 
is more so at the end of the decade than at the beginning. In the 1990s, large numbers of older 
male workers, especially in areas of industrial decline, were diverted from unemployment to 
sickness benefits. Subsequent estimates of ‘real’ local rates of unemployment have made use 
of IB data (Beatty & Fothergill 2005). However, by the end of the 2000s, much of the cohort 
diverted onto IB in 1990s had either reached retirement or died, and there is evidence that IB 
now serves the ‘correct’ client group (Gaffney 2011). Hence, to use IB without adjustment 
within measures of unemployment is both an empirical mistake and contributes to 
misrepresentations of how the scheme is used. However there is no simple way to adjust for 
this, so we follow the IMD’s practice. 
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Figure 6:  Workless Rates for Highest Worklessness Neighbourhoods Compared 
with Others 
 
 
Sources: DWP Working-age client group for small areas (DWP/NOMIS). Mid-year population 
estimates for LSOAs, England and Wales (ONS) 
 
Figure 7 examines these trends more closely, looking at gaps between high 
worklessness neighbourhoods in different contexts in England (London, other large 
English cities and other areas). Workless rates fell much faster in high-workless 
neighbourhoods in London and other major cities than they did in other types of place 
(smaller cities, towns and coastal and rural areas).  
 
Table 7 draws this picture out further by showing changes in the two components of 
workless rates: the number of workless people, and the total number of working-age 
adults that comprises the bottom half of the fraction. In London and other large cities 
in England, there was a slight rise in the count of workless people, but a very rapid 
increase in the total working-age population. This reflects the intensity of housing 
development and demographic change in deprived inner-city areas. In other deprived 
areas, the count of workless people rose more, but the working age population rose 
less, explaining the smaller reduction in workless rate.  
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Figure 7: Gap in neighbourhood workless rate, relative to all English non-poor 
neighbourhoods 
 
 
Values are calculated quarterly as a four-quarter moving average. 
Sources: DWP Working-age client group for small areas (DWP/NOMIS). Mid-year population 
estimates for LSOAs, (ONS);  
 
Table 7: Changes in Workless Counts and Working Age Population for High 
Worklessness Neighbourhoods (top 10%) by Country and Area type 
 
 
Change in workless count, 
 Q2 2000 - Q2 2010 
Change in working-
age population  
Q2 2000 - Q2 2010 
England, Large Cities +1.7 +14.1 
England, London +1.3 +16.7 
England, Other Deprived Areas +4.0 +10.9 
 
These data point to the importance of patterns of regional economic divergence, 
migration, housing allocation mechanisms, and urban development in explaining 
neighbourhood worklessness trends. They provide an important context for looking at 
policy effects and the limits of policy interventions, and we will be exploring more of 
these underlying factors as part of our ongoing work.  As Figure 8 shows, differences 
between neighbourhoods with different policy interventions do show slightly different 
trends. The graph shows gaps between high worklessness neighbourhoods in NDC 
and NRF programme areas and other neighbourhoods in England, with NDC 
comparators and all high worklessness areas shown for comparison.14   
14  We do not show the WNF districts separately; these were a subset of NRF areas and were 
pursuing labour-supply interventions during a period of weakening labour demand, as the 
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In the NDC areas – by no means all of which were in the highest-worklessness 10% - 
the excess worklessness was almost exactly the same as in the comparator (non-
intervention) areas at both the start and the end. This does not tell us whether or not 
employment interventions in the NDC areas were effective; since people move, age 
and die, we are not looking at the same population at each time point. Possibly NDC 
interventions enabled people to get into work and move away. It does, however, mean 
that NDC did not succeed in reducing disparities in workless rates – probably to be 
expected given the nature of the programme and its spending profile.  
 
Figure 8: Gap in neighbourhood worklessness rate for programme areas, relative 
to all non-poor England neighbourhoods 
 
 
Note: Values are calculated quarterly as a four-quarter moving average. 
Sources: DWP Working-age client group for small areas (DWP/NOMIS). Mid-year population 
estimates for LSOAs, England and Wales (ONS) 
 
In contrast, the workless rate in high worklessness neighbourhoods in NRF districts 
fell faster than for all high-workless neighbourhoods. This is certainly partly to do 
with regional divergence and the varying fates of areas with different geography and 
economic bases rather than with programme interventions. Those inside NRF areas 
were much more likely to be multicultural inner urban districts than deprived areas 
post-2008 trends for all neighbourhoods shows. 
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outside NRF districts, and thus more likely to have been influenced by urban 
economic growth and gentrification processes as well as by their NRF spend. Those 
with which they were compared contained a much larger proportion of small-town, 
rural and coastal poor neighbourhoods. Indeed econometric modelling conducted as 
part of the NRF evaluation showed the importance of local characteristics. 
Neighbourhoods with few low skilled jobs within 5km, high proportions of low 
skilled workers and high proportions of social housing saw lower falls in worklessness 
than other areas. Nevertheless the evaluators found a modest effect of NRF spend, 
controlling for other factors, suggesting that about 70,000 of the fall in work 
deprivation in NRF areas would not have occurred without the Fund. Areas with 
greater NRF spend were more likely to improve than areas with lower spend. Based 
on this, they concluded that reductions in worklessness alone constituted value for 
money, with estimated savings of £1.6bn compared with the estimated £312m spent 
through NRF directly on worklessness.     
 
Conclusions  
In 1997, Labour inherited a situation of widening spatial inequality in social and 
economic outcomes, physical environment and standards of public service provision, 
and severe problems in some ex-industrial neighbourhoods with almost valueless 
properties, abandonment, vacant housing, environmental decline, and high crime and 
anti-social behaviour. The principal response of the previous Conservative 
government during the 1990s had been the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge 
Fund, a funding programme to support thematic or neighbourhood-based regeneration 
programmes designed by local partnerships. 
 
Labour responded to the problems with a significant increase in spending and activity, 
increasing during the 2000s and peaking in 2007/8. It gave political priority to 
neighbourhood renewal and established new machinery in central and local 
government for the long term redistribution of resources and services towards the 
poorest areas.  
  
Initial goals were extremely ambitious, and broad, incorporating aims to change the 
environment, amenities and services offered, the capacity of residents to influence 
change, the effect of neighbourhoods on socio-economic outcomes, and to change 
these outcomes themselves. At the heart of the NSNR was an intention to reform the 
way that government approached poor neighbourhoods and the distribution of 
resources and services between places, principally on equity grounds. However, the 
full breadth of these goals was not well reflected in the targets and measures adopted. 
Most of the statistical targets that were enunciated related to reducing inequalities in 
individual outcomes, thus obscuring from the official record the central importance to 
the policy endeavour of place improvements per se, efforts to build community 
capacity and influence, and institutional change.  Equally the targets did not, and 
perhaps were not able to, discriminate between what could reasonably be expected 
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from area-based interventions and the effects of aspatial social policies and urban 
economic change.  
 
Perhaps because of the difficulty in measuring and justifying neighbourhood renewal 
spend and perhaps for other reasons including the increasing influence of the Treasury 
and of spatial economics, policy goals shifted over time. By 2007, neighbourhood 
renewal was seen as having primarily an economic rationale, tackling worklessness 
and promoting neighbourhood economic sustainability, rather than a fairness 
rationale, using state spending to equalise the distribution of public goods and 
opportunities in the face of deindustrialisation and social change. Spending was 
reduced and more narrowly focused on tackling worklessness.  There was a shift of 
interventions to a larger spatial scale in order to transform places and individual 
outcomes. 
 
This change, however, came relatively late. By 2007 evidence was indicating that that 
NRF and mainstream central government spending was generating large and 
noticeable improvements in neighbourhood environments and services: for example 
new childcare centres, health centres, and community buildings, better neighbourhood 
management and policing and reduced crime, a higher standard of housing, new 
school buildings and extended services in schools, Gaps in neighbourhood satisfaction 
were closing slightly, overall, and residents of programme areas reported that their 
areas were getting better.  In relation to the original ameliorative logic (set out at the 
start of this report), this should be seen as an end in itself. 
 
Gaps in social and economic outcomes were also closing in domains that could be 
most directly influenced by policy, such as school outcomes and deaths from cardio-
vascular disease, although less so, or not at all, in other domains such as life 
expectancy. Worklessness gaps also closed. However, it is hard to conclude that 
particular change this was primarily due to neighbourhood renewal policy. More 
likely changes were due to absorption of marginal labour as the economy expanded in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, combined with the relatively good economic 
performance of Northern cities and the repopulation and gentrification of inner urban 
areas, particularly but not exclusively in London. Active labour market programmes 
played a contributory role (McKnight 2007). NRF appears to have a modest effect on 
worklessness reduction. 
 
On the whole, the extent to which the gaps closed was in line with what was expected 
when targets were set. That neighbourhood disparities in individual outcomes 
remained large at the end of the period is probably what could be expected given the 
scale of the funding involved and the influence of wider economic, social and 
demographic factors on individual social and economic outcomes. The programmes 
represented a significant addition to what had gone before but did not fundamentally 
alter the distribution of funding for public services, nor did they initially set out to 
erase spatial inequalities altogether.  
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The poorest areas now face a period of acute economic pressure as the impact of the 
financial crash and recession hit home. What happens in these neighbourhoods 
between 2010 and 2014, under the Coalition’s new policy regime, will be the focus of 
our ongoing work in the SPCC research programme. 
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